This paper establishes how the rule came into existence that recovery of money paid was barred, if the claimant had made a mistake of law. This rule was removed in the law of restitution in 1998 by Kleinwort Benson v Lincoln City Council after a long campaign arguing that it made no sense, 1 and subsequently removed in contract as well. We refer to this as the mistake of law bar. We see what concerns led to the rule, and suggest that one element may have been confusion between three distinct issues; barring recovery of payments by inexcusable mistake, barring recovery of voluntary payments, and barring recovery of payments by mistake of law. It was not true that early lawyers had no idea what they were doing. They thought there were good reasons for the bar -and there may yet be cases where it has to be treated differently to mistakes of fact.
Firstly, we see what the eighteenth century position was. There was dissent. Some lawyers believed that mistakes of law did not attract relief. Some believed they did. Secondly, we examine the different senses of voluntary payment and how the uncertainty in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries as to what counted as a voluntary payment contributed to confusion as to whether there was a mistake of law bar. We also seek to explain what Lord Ellenborough meant in Bilbie v Lumley, 2 the case said to introduce the bar. 3 The claimant insurer had paid an insurance claim, not realising that he was not obliged to do so, because the defendant insured had failed to disclose information relevant to his decision whether or not to insure. The information had, however, come into his possession before he paid out. The mistake alleged was that the claimant had not known the non-disclosure entitled him to rescind. Lord Ellenborough asked counsel, Mr Wood, if he knew of any cases where a voluntary payment made by mistake of law with full knowledge of the facts had been recovered. When counsel did not reply, Lord Ellenborough said that every man must be taken to be cognisant of the law, and barred relief. 4 Thirdly, we see the other pressures that influenced courts in the introduction of the bar.
(1) The Eighteenth Century
Lord Wright thought that during the eighteenth century relief was available for mistake of law. 5 Keener also thought that that was the case. 6 However, Goff and Jones suggest that the situation was not so clear cut. 7 Goff and Jones are correct to sound a note of caution. Amongst other things, the system of unjust factors, or reasons for restitution, was not well developed in the eighteenth century. It may be that restitution was available where the defendant had no reason to retain the assets.
In 1793 Fonblanque suggested that relief could not be obtained in equity against a mistake of law. 8 However, Sir William Evans argued in 1802 and again in 1806 that the authorities justified a rule that money paid as a result of a mistake of law could be recovered. There was clearly therefore a debate going on at the turn of the nineteenth century. We firstly examine Sir William Evans' argument in favour of allowing relief, and secondly see that there are other cases, which can be said to support the provision of relief. In the last section we examine the eighteenth century writers and cases suggesting that mistake of law did not attract relief.
(A) Sir William Evans' Argument
Sir William Evans said, 9 'The opinion of the old interpreters is, that if no natural obligation intervenes, even what is paid under a mistake in law, may be recovered back, in which opinion I concur.' One of the cases he cited for this proposition is Farmer v Arundel, 10 a case from 1772. The claimant paid the defendant, believing that under the poor laws he was obliged to repay to the defendant sums that the latter had spent on the upkeep of a third party pauper. It turned out that as a matter of law he was not obliged to reimburse the defendant. He sought to recover the money. The defendant had not been obliged to make the payments, and had saved the claimant expense, because the claimant was obliged to provide necessaries for the pauper. The claimant therefore had a moral duty to reimburse the defendant. The court held that, money paid by mistake could be recovered, whether that was by mistake of law or fact; however, because this money was due in honour it could not be recovered. 11 The idea of money "due in honour" has translated into natural obligations in modern law, 12 which bar recovery of money paid by mistake of law, and Evans recognised their existence at the turn of the nineteenth century.
Evans thought that the decision that recovery was barred, because of the duty in honour to pay, rendered obiter the judgment that payments under mistake of law were prima facie recoverable. 13 However, had the court not decided that money paid under mistake of law was prima facie recoverable it would not have needed to make the further decision that on the facts the money was not recoverable. The decision that a payment by mistake of law was recoverable was therefore an integral part of the court's reasoning, and part of the ratio decidendi.
A second case on which Evans relied was Bize v Dickason, 14 in 1786. The claimant was an insurance broker, who had engaged the bankrupt third party as underwriter. On his bankruptcy the underwriter owed £662 to the claimant as a result of various insurance losses. The claimant owed a greater sum to the bankrupt in underwriting premiums. He paid these premiums to the defendant, the bankrupt's trustee in bankruptcy, without deducting the £662, mistakenly believing he was not entitled to do so. He was. On discovering his mistake, he sought to recover this sum. Lord Mansfield said that if the claimant paid what in equity he ought to pay he could not recover. 15 However, he could recover if he made a payment by mistake where the recipient had no claim in conscience to retain it. Lord Mansfield therefore allowed recovery, as the defendant had no claim to retain the £662. Evans claimed that on the facts this could only mean that the mistake of law, as to whether the money could be deducted, allowed recovery. 16 In Brisbane v Dacres 17 Gibbs J did not accept Bize v Dickason as authority that money paid under a mistake of law could be recovered back. 18 He argued that Lord Mansfield could not have meant that money paid under mistake of law was recoverable. Given that relief was permitted, this seems unlikely. The decision is certainly inconsistent with only mistake of fact attracting relief. Gibbs J's reasoning was that Lord Mansfield had been on the court in Lowry v Bourdieu, 19 six years before Bize v Dickason, where Buller J had decided that money paid under a mistake of law could not be recovered. 20 Similarly Buller J, who was on the court in Bize v Dickason, would not have allowed the matter to pass unquestioned had the question of the recovery of money paid by mistake of law been raised. Stadden commented that this was a weak argument, based on surmise as to the reason for a judge's silence. 21 Evans insisted that Lowry v Bourdieu was no authority for the proposition that money could not be recovered where the payor had made a mistake of law. 22 The claimant had lent money to a third party, Lawson, and bought an insurance policy from the defendant on Lawson's ship, which was carrying cargo to be sold to satisfy the debt. The voyage was a success and the vessel came into port safely. The insured claimant sought to recover the premium on the policy on the grounds that he had had no insurable interest in the ship, and that he had paid the money under a mistake of law as to the validity of the policy. The policy was in fact illegal. Evans claimed that the question whether money paid by mistake of law could be recovered, and the question in Lowry v Bourdieu whether a sum of money could be recovered, when it was clear that the advantage bargained for could not have been obtained, were distinct. 23 Lord Mansfield rested his decision in Lowry v Bourdieu on questions of illegality, which were not present in Bize v Dickason. 24 Although it is not as clear, Ashhurst J probably rested his on the same issue. 25 There appears to be no doubt that Buller J said that there would be no restitution for mistake of law, at least where the 15 contract of insurance was fully executed. 26 Evans observed that the question was how much attention should be paid to Buller J's reference to ignorantia juris non excusat. Evans argued that the maxim was inappropriate in the context, and inconsistent with Buller J's proposition that the money would have been recoverable had the contract been executory. 27 This need not be the case -it may be that Buller J thought mistakes of law as to illegality ought not attract relief, which would amount to carving out an exception to the general rule. At the same time his references to executory contracts can be seen as very early development of locus poenitentiae, the rule that claimants can repent and claim their money back before the illegal purpose is in fact attempted.
Evans relied on another case that he himself admitted to be weak. 28 That was Ancher v Bank of England, 29 decided in 1781. Ancher drew a bill of exchange on the bank in favour of Dahl who indorsed it to Moestue. Moestue restrained its negotiability, so it could not be validly passed to a third party indorsee. It was later negotiated on a forged indorsement to the fraudster, who obtained payment. The forgery was then discovered, and Ancher, whose agent had arranged for payment, sought to recover from the defendant bank and succeeded. Ashhurst J rested his judgment on the mistake that the money due on the bill was due to the fraudster. 30 Evans argued that there was no mistake of fact because the restraint on indorsement was clear on the face of the bill, or if there were a mistake, it was due to negligence so gross as to deny any right to relief. There were no circumstances of fraud, or any other grounds, on which the action could have proceeded. The mistake for which the claimant recovered must therefore have been one of law. 31 A caveat should, however, be entered. It was not the whole court who proceeded on the basis of mistake. The other judges in the majority examined the effect of the restraint on the bill's negotiability. The bank could not, having paid the fraudster, have maintained an action against the claimant, Ancher, for the recovery of the payment of the bill because it was non-negotiable, and therefore Ancher could himself recover. 32 The decision fits with Kremer's argument that recovery could be had in the eighteenth century simply because no consideration was given. 33 Indeed the decision fits rather better with such an interpretation than that mistake had any role to play.
There is a parallel in Scots law. Evans-Jones has demonstrated that Roman law had not made a definite choice between two rival traditions. Scots law imported the controversy and only finally made a decision in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. 34 The first view was that the pursuer be mistaken before he could Finally, Evans argued that the action of money had and received was founded on reasons of equity and moral rectitude, and that any exception must be based on the same principles. 35 To bar relief where the mistake was one of law, rather than one of fact, was not justifiable on grounds of equity.
(B) Other Cases Supporting Relief for Mistake of Law
We examine the two most frequently cited, although there are others. 36 Lansdowne v Lansdowne 37 was decided in 1730. There were three Lansdowne brothers originally, and the middle brother died. The two survivors agreed to divide his lands between them. They did so on the mistaken advice that land could not ascend, so the younger brother was the heir rather than the elder. After the death of the younger brother, his lands devolved to his son. The surviving brother, the eldest, sued in the court of Chancery for recovery of the land from his nephew and the cancellation of the agreement. He claimed that he had been mistaken in believing that the youngest brother was entitled to the land as heir. The Lord Chancellor, Lord King, held that the bond and indentures were made by mistake of law, and that they should be given up to be cancelled. 38 Bingham v Bingham 39 was decided in 1748. The claimant bought an estate from the defendant. On discovering that the estate was his all along, he sued in the court of Chancery for the return of the money paid. It was held that equity relieved against bargains made under a misconception of rights, including a mistaken belief as to ownership of a given piece of property.
Both of these cases involved a mistake of law. However, in both cases the mistake could be characterised as a mistake as to private rights. Mistakes as to private rights were later squeezed into an exception to the mistake of law bar. 40 For this reason the cases were no doubt seen in the later nineteenth century as being weak authority against the bar. 
(C) Cases and Writing against the Provision of Relief for Mistake of Law
In 1793 Fonblanque maintained that where the claimant had made a mistake of law he ought not to receive relief. He argued, 'As to ignorance of law, it may be laid down as a general proposition, that it shall not affect agreements, nor excuse from the legal consequences of particular acts, even in courts of equity.' 41 He relied for this proposition on the maxim ignorantia juris non excusat, and the case of Harman v Camm. 42 That case was authority for the following proposition. If two men were bound to another by a joint obligation, and the creditor released one debtor, believing that he had not released the other, he released both parties. The mistake of law had no effect. Fonblanque 43 commented that there was only one case where the contrary was asserted and that was Lansdowne v Lansdowne, where the Lord Chancellor argued that the use of the maxim ignorantia juris non excusat outside the criminal context was illegitimate. 44 It may be that Fonblanque would explain Bingham v Bingham as being a mistake as to facts, and indeed possibly Lansdowne v Lansdowne as well, although he does regard that one dictum in the case to be against him. Fonblanque's explanation of Harman v Camm -that it can be explained as being a case of relief being denied because the mistake was one of lawassumes that it is possible to release one party to a joint obligation, but not the other. This would seem unlikely -the nature of a joint liability is that both parties are together taken as one party. On this basis the release is either of both parties or neither. The mistake of law has no effect. It does not make possible the impossible. Fonblanque was relying on a case, authority for no proposition of use to him.
Other than Lowry v Bourdieu, Munt v Stokes,
45 in 1792, is the only eighteenth century case where there was a reasonably explicit suggestion that mistake of law did not allow relief. 46 The testator had borrowed money on a type of loan contract illegal in England. The executors had repaid the loan, and sought to recover the money on the basis of their mistaken view of their liability to pay. Lord Kenyon said that the parties were bound to know the law. 47 He appears to have thought the claimants were not mistaken, but his allusion to the maxim ignorantia juris non excusat suggests that it would not have mattered if they had been mistaken as to the law. Evans was, however, unimpressed by the authority of this case as to the mistake of law bar. 48 He said that the dictum was no more than an incidental remark, and any inference from the general knowledge of the law we are presumed to possess would be inconsistent with the principles he (Evans) had set out earlier. 49 There may well have been a question whether mistakes as to illegality ought to be treated differently. The second point is that Lord Kenyon barred relief because the parties were bound in honour, which barred otherwise good mistake claims. This is a curious reason. It is hard to see how one could be bound in honour to do something that was illegal, but even leaving this to one side obligations binding in honour have emerged in modern English law as natural obligations, which as we have seen already bar recovery of payments made in mistake of law -this is because the payment was in fact due, albeit unenforceable.
(2) The Early Nineteenth Century: Separate Ideas Confused
In judgments from the early nineteenth century there is a connection, or juxtaposition, between voluntary payments and mistake of law. The first instance seems to be in Bilbie v Lumley. Lord Ellenborough asked counsel 'whether he could state any case where if a party paid money to another voluntarily with a full knowledge of the facts of the case he could recover it back again on account of his ignorance of law.'
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Treatise writers also juxtaposed the ideas of voluntary payment and mistake of law. Selwyn, for instance, stated that where a party paid money to another voluntarily, with full knowledge, or full means of knowledge, he could not recover on account of his ignorance of law. 51 This is important. The exposition of the law in terms of the irrecoverability of voluntary payments made by mistake of law causes us to consider what 'voluntary payment' actually meant and whether recovery was at least initially denied because the payment was voluntary, rather than because of the mistake of law.
The first section is devoted to showing that there were several different senses of voluntary payment, which together could swallow up relief for mistake of law. The second shows that there was an excusability requirement in English law at the beginning of the nineteenth century, which may have been confused with the voluntary payments idea. The third section seeks to explain Bilbie v Lumley. We see that it was the voluntary nature of the payment that barred relief.
(A) Voluntary Payments
'Voluntary payment' naturally means a payment the payor wants to make. At law, however, its meaning rapidly became unstable. The eighteenth century cases show a number of different meanings. The confusion remains today. 52 This section aims to straighten out some of the different meanings that the phrase bore, and suggests ways in which the confusion might have contributed to the introduction of the mistake of law bar. 53 Lord Ellenborough said nothing that obviously contradicts that. He asked if Mr Wood knew of any cases where money paid voluntarily under a mistake of law had ever been recovered. An uncoerced, voluntary, payment in mistake of law would be barred, but not a coerced payment. Lord Ellenborough considered Chatfield v Paxton to be a case against his assertions about mistake of law. 54 The claimants drew a bill of exchange on a third party drawee, which the defendants obtained and attempted to claim payment from the drawees. The drawee became insolvent and the defendants sent it back to the drawer, protested for non-payment. The defendants then drew a bill on the claimants as drawees to discharge the claimants' supposed debt to them. The claimants accepted liability to discharge the bill. Before they finally became liable to pay, however, it became clear that the facts were such that they had not needed to take on such liability. Nonetheless they paid, and attempted to recover, from the defendants, the money they had paid. Relief was allowed, but the claimant had protested when paying. This might be explained as a coerced payment, as protest is at least evidence of coercion; 55 however, Lord Ellenborough treats it as a voluntary payments case. 56 This may be because coercion by legal process is not coercion that the legal process can take any account of. The decision therefore poses difficulties for Lord Ellenborough since he argued voluntary payments by mistake of law did not attract relief -and one had attracted relief here. They are, as we will see, reconcilable. In Chatfield v Paxton the mistake the claimants made may have been excusable, justifying relief -while that in Bilbie v Lumley was inexcusable, thus denying relief.
Nonetheless there is some warrant for accepting that 'voluntary' meant uncoerced. In Irving v Wilson 57 the claimant sent hams from Scotland to Carlisle. He obtained a permit for this, but the wagons became separated. Customs officers seized the first set of wagons, the permit being with the second set, and refused to release them until the fee for the licence were paid. The claimant made the second payment. Ashhurst J said that it was not a voluntary payment because when the defendants stopped the goods the claimant was in their power. 58 He said 'It was a payment by coercion'. 59 The contrast between a payment by coercion and a voluntary payment implied that any payment that was not coerced was voluntary. The case looks more like a case of duress of goods, such as Astley v Reynolds, 60 at least to modern eyes. The claimant pawned a plate to the defendant for £20 and the latter sought £10 in interest, not allowing the claimant to take the plate until he had paid. After he had paid, the claimant brought an action to recover £10, and succeeded. He insisted that 53 where there was extortion the payment was involuntary. 61 This again shows the contrast that was drawn between coerced involuntary payments and uncoerced voluntary payments. This is important because it could have led lawyers to an erroneous conclusion. If mistake of law cases involving coerced non-voluntary payments attracted relief, and mistake of law cases involving voluntary payments did not, it would have been easy to come to the conclusion that the voluntariness of the payment was crucial. If there were a sense of 'voluntary' in which it meant uncoerced, it would have been easy to conclude, erroneously, that the coercion, rather than the mistake, allowed restitution.
(
ii) Payments under Pressure of Legal Process
The sense of voluntary payment under discussion here is that the payment is voluntary where compelled only by due process. This is interesting because this is coercion of which the law can take no notice. 62 If a voluntary payment were merely an uncoerced payment, voluntary payments could be taken to include payments pressured by legal process. Thus enlarged it could cover almost all cases of relief for mistake of law.
In Knibbs v Hall 63 the claimant was indebted to the defendant for rent. He insisted that the latter accept a lower rent than he was demanding, which the latter refused to do. The defendant distrained for the balance of the rent he claimed was outstanding, after the claimant's payment of the lesser sum. After the claimant paid the balance, he argued that he could prove he had only been obliged to pay the lower rent. He claimed to set off the overpayments in future payments of rent. The court held that where a party threatened with distress for rent had a defence at that time, but paid, he could not recover the money, because his payment was voluntary. 64 In Brown v M'Kinally 65 the claimant and defendant entered an agreement, by which the defendant agreed to sell old iron at £9 per ton. The iron was mixed with bushel iron of inferior quality and sold at the same rate. The claimant paid the price under pressure of being sued, but he reserved a right to sue himself. He later exercised this right. Lord Kenyon argued, 'Money paid by mistake was recoverable in assumpsit but here it was paid voluntarily and could not be recovered'. 66 Previously he had said that he could not give relief, because the claimant relied on an argument available to him when he made the payment. 67 There appears to have been a connection made between the two. Selwyn discussed these cases in a footnote to the discussion of In many cases where the payor had made a mistake of law, the mistake would be that he had no defence to the legal claim, or demand, originally made against him. If so, and a payment were voluntary where it was made pursuant to a demand, a bar to recovery of voluntary payments could cover almost all cases of mistake of law -this is particularly clear when we see the impact of settlement.
(iii) Settlement
Goff and Jones argue that Bilbie v Lumley can be seen as being a case of voluntary payment in the following sense.
71 If a payment is made in mistake of law, with full knowledge of the relevant facts, in response to a demand, it may be characterised as voluntary if the party has taken the risk that he may be mistaken. 72 Alternatively we may say that the payment was made in settlement of the demand. There seems again nothing that obviously contradicts the proposition that Lord Ellenborough meant a voluntary payment to be one paid in response to a demand. The facts were that the payment was made in response to a demand. Brisbane v Dacres merely followed Bilbie v Lumley by holding that type of payment to be voluntary. 73 A captain paid over a proportion of freight received for the carriage of publicly owned bullion to his admiral, believing it due under an old custom. However, it later turned out that it was not due. He could not recover from the admiral's widow. Gibbs J made the point that there are many doubtful questions of law and, when they arise, the defendant has an option to litigate them. 74 He said
We must take this payment to have been made under a demand of right, and I think that where a man demands money of another as a matter of right, and that other, with a full knowledge of the facts upon which the demand is founded, has paid a sum, he never can recover back the sum he has so voluntarily paid.
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Later he referred to Chatfield v Paxton as supporting this proposition.
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Chatfield is consistent with the position, it is true, but does not seem to require it. Gibbs J was concerned with the question of finality of dispute settlement. He said that by paying the claimant closes the transaction. Brisbane v Dacres may therefore be no authority for the proposition that payments made in mistake of law were irrecoverable; rather it may be authority for the proposition that voluntary payments in settlement of a demand were irrecoverable. This runs into the objection that there was no actual demand by the admiral, but Gibbs J said that it must be taken as if there were. 77 Heath J said that a payment in the knowledge that a demand was going to be made had to be treated the same as a payment made subsequently to a demand. 78 The notion of a made-up (or constructive) demand obviously must be treated with caution -it could become an easy device for enlarging the bar.
A requirement of the cause of action, although it seems not to have been made explicit until Kelly v Solari, 79 was that the mistake had to be as to liability. The insurer in that case had paid out on a life insurance policy to Mrs Solari, after she had made a claim, believing the policy to be valid, whereas in fact it had lapsed. The insurer recovered because his mistake was as to his liability to pay. If a demand were made and a belief existed that the payor was liable, relief would be barred -once that is extended to cases not involving an actual demand -almost all cases are covered. The assumption we make is that if we do not pay what we owe, we will be asked to do so. If this were recognised, it must have contributed to the growing belief that relief was unavailable for mistake of law.
(iv) A Preliminary Conclusion There were several senses in which voluntary payments were understood. The most important seem to have been that the payment was not coerced, that it was pressured by legal process, and that the payment was made in settlement, or submission to an honest claim. These different senses of voluntary payment could easily swallow the availability of relief for mistake of law. To say therefore that relief was not available for voluntary payment under mistake of law was tantamount to refusing it altogether for mistake of law. The only obvious case where a mistake of law might be present, and yet relief was given would be a coerced payment by mistake of law; however, in such cases it is easy to see relief as being given for the coercion.
(B) Excusable Mistakes
We must distinguish voluntary payments from payments by inexcusable mistake. In modern South African law relief will not be given if the mistake is slack or inexcusable.
80 South African lawyers do not, however, make a connection with voluntary payments. We firstly show that there was an excusability requirement in early nineteenth century English law. We show in the second subsection that confusion may have developed between the concept of payment by inexcusable mistake and the concept of voluntary payment.
(i) The Requirement
In the early nineteenth century a view was held that a mistake, to be relieved, had to be one such that the claimant did not have the ready means of discovering its falsehood. In essence this is a requirement that the mistake be excusable. One example of an inexcusable mistake is a mistake that the claimant ought not to have made because of the ease in discovering that it was in fact untrue. In Scotland inexcusable mistake was described in these terms, as having the full or easy means of knowledge available.
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In Martin v Morgan 82 the defendants presented a post-dated cheque, knowing it to be post-dated, and knowing that the drawer of it was insolvent. The claimants paid the cheque, expecting to be put in funds shortly afterwards. They claimed the money back on discovering the drawer's insolvency. They lost because they ought to have known of the insolvency. Dallas CJ held, 'The rule of law is, that where money is paid with full knowledge, or with full means of knowledge of the circumstances attending the demand, the party paying is not entitled to recover back such payment.'
(ii) Excusability and Voluntariness
In Bilbie v Lumley counsel contended 'that the money having been paid with full knowledge or full means of knowledge could not be recovered. ' 84 This, as we have seen, is the language of excusability. It is hard to see how this made the payment voluntary. Bilbie v Lumley can therefore be seen as an example of inexcusable error. The insurer ought to have known that they could have rescinded the contract for nondisclosure. However, Bilbie v Lumley was a case expressly concerned with voluntary payments. Lord Ellenborough made this clear by asking whether Mr Wood knew of any cases of voluntary payments in mistake of law where the money was recovered. 85 The head note makes no mention of this, saying that 'money paid by one with full knowledge (or the means of such knowledge in his hands) of all the circumstances cannot be recovered back again on account of such payments having been made under an ignorance of law'. 86 The reporter appears not to have thought that Lord Ellenborough's reference to voluntary payments was crucial, or maybe he thought that the head note summarised accurately the judgment, including the reference to voluntariness.
This suggests confusion between payments by inexcusable mistake and voluntary payments. There is further evidence for this. Comyn for example argued, "Upon the subject of voluntary payments, the rule of law is, that where money is paid with full knowledge, or with full means of knowledge of the circumstances attending the demand, the party is not entitled to recover back such payment, though made 81 Chatfield v Paxton provides further evidence of confusion between the two concepts. The claimant did not know the full facts at the time that the he accepted liability to pay the sum due on the bill of exchange. Ashhurst J suggested on the motion for a new trial that because the claimant had protested, the claimant's payment was not voluntary. This would suggest that he felt it was a case of coercion. However, he also said that where the payment was made 'not with full knowledge but only under a blind suspicion of the case' it ought to be recovered. This appears to suggest that, at least sometimes, where the claimant was mistaken and did not investigate the facts fully he could recover. Grose J was equivocal, arguing that he was not completely satisfied the claimant did not have sufficient knowledge of the facts to render it a voluntary payment; nonetheless he acquiesced in the judgment. It may be that the party did not have the means of knowledge to fall foul of the excusability rule. Lawrence J made comments to much the same effect. He used language better suited to describing the excusability of the mistake and then argued that the maxim volenti non fit injuria could not be used. The use of this maxim looks strange to modern eyes where it is normally deployed in tort cases, but it reflects a sense in which the payment was the claimant's fault. It appears that the case can either be seen as a case where the mistake was not quite inexcusable enough, or the level of knowledge available to the claimants was not enough, to render the payment voluntary. The two concepts had simply become intertwined.
Young v Campbell
In Kelly v Solari the excusability requirement was dropped, and the cause of action defined without reference to the requirement. Parke B said, Where money is paid to another under the influence of a mistake, that is, upon the supposition that a particular fact is true, which would entitle the other to the money, but which fact is untrue and the money would not have been paid if it had been known to the payer that the fact was untrue, an action will lie to recover it back and it is against conscience to retain it. 88 Parke B made it clear though that where the claimant deliberately chose not to investigate he would be held to have acted voluntarily. 89 It may be that Comyn and members of the court in Chatfield v Paxton thought that where the party had the full means of knowledge in his hands his not availing himself of those means rendered the payment voluntary -ie all failures to inquire further are deliberate. Perhaps further they concluded these cases were examples of settlement. This cannot be right; the negligence of the payor may have been that he did not realise that the means were available to him. The distinction between payments under inexcusable mistake and payments after deliberately choosing not to investigate had not, however, previously 87 This enlarged the ambit of voluntary payments yet further and further squeezed the range of cases in which relief could be obtained for mistake of law. However, the bar to recovery of payments under inexcusable mistake had another important effect. Lord Brougham LC said that the law was available to all and therefore it was not unreasonable to assume that everyone knew it. 90 This fits the sense of excusability just discussed -means of knowledge of the law are available, but was patently false. In Montriou v Jefferys Abbott CJ commented that it would be ludicrous to think that everybody, even attorneys, actually knew the law .91 The attorney in question had billed his client wrongly, as a result of his mistake of law, and was allowed to recover the additional sums due. Austin argued that the maxim must not be understood as implying that mistakes of law as a class were inexcusable, but that recovery must be barred for very practical reasons.
S Comyn The Law of Contracts and Promises upon Various Subjects with Particular Persons as
92 Nonetheless Story supported the Lord Chancellor. He argued that where we have the means available to us to discover our legal rights we are assumed to know them. 93 He may have seen a connection between the maxim ignorantia juris non excusat and excusability of the mistake. He argued
The ground of this distinction between ignorance of law and ignorance of fact seems to be, that, as every man of reasonable understanding is presumed to know the law, and to act upon the rights which it confers or supports, when he knows all the facts, it is culpable negligence in him to do an act, or to make a contract, and then to set up his ignorance of law as a defence…but no person can be presumed to be acquainted with all matters of fact; neither is it possible, by any degree of diligence, to acquire that knowledge; and therefore, an ignorance of facts does not import culpable negligence. 94 The implication is that mistakes of law are inexcusable, as a class, but mistakes of fact are not; presumably with diligence it is possible to acquire knowledge of all the law relating to the instant case. This gives us an interesting parallel with later developments in Scotland and South Africa where it appears mistakes of law 90 100 and a passage where Vinnius claimed there were no passages in the Pandects justifying a distinction between mistakes of law and fact. 101 These were debates of which English authors were aware. Austin for example referred to the Digest 102 in his lectures on the subject, and Evans was well aware of the Roman texts as well. Indeed the view of mistakes of law as being inexcusable continued anachronistically after any requirement of the excusability of the mistake had been removed. 103 We might conclude that the inexcusability of the mistake was a factor in the introduction of the bar. If mistakes of law were routinely thought inexcusable, and payments under inexcusable mistake voluntary, it would have been easy to conclude that payments under mistake of law were necessarily voluntary, and therefore irrecoverable.
(iii) The Removal of the Excusability Requirement
The requirement ceased to be applied in England in the middle of the century. In Kelly v Solari Parke B held that it did not matter that the insurer had been negligent, because, unless he had paid intending that the payee have the money in any case, he would be able to recover. 104 This bar where the payor intended the payee to have the money in any case is a bar in cases of conscious risk-taking or settlement. honest claim, as Goff and Jones suggest, 106 and Kelly v Solari was not, the defence operated differently in cases of mistake of law and mistake of fact. The defence of submission to an honest claim operates, and operated, where the defendant honestly claimed the money, and the claimant paid him in order to close the transaction.
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McKendrick suggests that the inconsistency means the early mistake of law cases cannot be explained in terms of submission to an honest claim. 108 If they could, Kelly v Solari should be seen as wrongly decided, as it too was a submission case. The only distinction was the nature of the mistake as one of law in Bilbie v Lumley.
McKendrick is right that there is a similarity, and apparent inconsistency in the two cases. However, Kelly v Solari would have been decided differently had it been decided in 1802. This becomes clear once it is realised that both Kelly v Solari and Bilbie v Lumley are inexcusable mistake cases. Kelly had the means of discovering that the money was not due to Mrs Solari. The insurers had actually written on the policy that it had been cancelled -only if it were a more explicit submission would the insurer's claim fail. It was not a payment in final settlement of a dispute. Earlier in the century they would have been unable to recover the money, because their mistake of fact was inexcusable, just as it appears that the insurer in Bilbie v Lumley made an inexcusable mistake, having the means of full knowledge in his hands. That would have barred relief and the question of a settlement of a dispute would not have come up.
(C) Decisions of Lord Ellenborough Supporting Relief for Mistake of Law
The thesis of this paper so far is that after Bilbie v Lumley a number of different ideas were confused: payments by mistake of law, payments by inexcusable mistake and voluntary payments. Bilbie v Lumley itself did not give us the rule, nor properly understood was it intended to do so. This section seeks to explain two decisions of Lord Ellenborough in which he grants relief for mistake of law. It seeks to demonstrate that these can be explained consistently with the explanation of Bilbie v Lumley as a voluntary payments case. Certainly Bilbie v Lumley cannot, as Birks accepted, be seen as a serious intellectual commitment to the mistake of law bar.
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Lord Ellenborough's invocation of ignorantia juris non excusat seems not to have been fully thought through. This section first sets out these two later cases. In the second subsection we attempt to explain the distinction between them and Bilbie v Lumley.
(i) Herbert v Champion and Perrott v Perrott
In Herbert v Champion 110 the facts were indistinguishable from those of Bilbie v Lumley except that the payment had not been made; the underwriter had only promised to pay. He was allowed to rescind the promise. In Perrott v Perrott 111 the 106 Goff and Jones (n 3) 214 107 S Arrowsmith 'Mistake and the Role of the "Submission to an Honest Claim"' in AS Burrows (ed) defendant gave a penal bond as security for her payment of £1000, after Territ's death, to such person as the latter appointed, either by deed or by will. Territ made a deed appointing the claimant to receive the money, but later cut her name and seal off that deed, because she had made a will purporting to appoint other relatives of hers to receive the money. The litigation occurred after Territ's death and centred on the entitlement to the money. The defendant pleaded that there had been no appointment at all, because the will was ineffective, and the deed had been cancelled. The claimant had no entitlement. The claimant argued that Territ had made a mistake in believing the will a valid appointment, and that the cancellation of the deed was therefore to be disregarded. Lord Ellenborough held that mistake, whether a mistake of fact, or of law, was enough to annul the cancellation. 112 The claimant was entitled to the money. Lord Ellenborough relied on the case of Onions v Tyrer 113 as authority for this proposition. In that case the devisor had made a will devising his land to trustees for certain uses, but had then made another will revoking the first, and appointing new trustees. This second will was void. The question for the court was whether the void second will operated as a revocation of the first. If so, the deceased's heir at law was entitled to the land; if not, the original trustees remained entitled. The Lord Chancellor, Lord Harcourt, said the second will did not revoke the first. He would also have been prepared to give relief by way of reinstating the first will, if the second had been effective, on the grounds of the devisor's mistake of law as to the validity of the second will.
(ii) The Cases Explained
There are three possible explanations for the seeming inconsistency between Lord Ellenborough's refusal of relief for mistake of law in Bilbie v Lumley and grant of it in these cases. Only the third seems ultimately satisfying.
The first explanation is that Lord Ellenborough saw a distinction between the cancellation of deeds and of wills and promises, and payment of money. In some circumstances this is nonsensical. Evans had already stated that if a payment made under a mistake of law were recoverable, a promise made under the same mistake of law could not be enforceable. 115 The result would otherwise be absurd. This must be right, and there is no reason to ascribe a different view to Lord Ellenborough. The explanation demonstrates too little. It cannot be said that because Lord Ellenborough allowed relief in Herbert v Champion and Perrott v Perrott where there had been no payment he did not believe that payments by mistake of law could not be recovered. There is no logical reason why if promises to pay made under mistake of law are not binding that payments under mistake of law should be reversible. Lord Ellenborough himself explained Herbert v Champion this way, distinguishing it from Bilbie v Lumley. A payment would have bound the underwriter, but the promise would only do so where there was consideration and a binding contractual compromise.
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The second possible explanation is that Lord Ellenborough had changed his mind. This may be because he read two pieces by Sir William Evans, one of which appeared just prior to Bilbie v Lumley. That piece, 'An Essay on the Action of Money Had and Received' would have been available to him immediately, as it had been dedicated to him. This explanation is, however, unsatisfactory because it assumes that Lord Ellenborough was ignorant, and the counsel Mr Wood was ignorant, of the cases that supported recovery for mistake of law, of which there were several.
The third explanation is that Lord Ellenborough believed that mistakes of law could attract relief, but that they would not do so in cases of voluntary payment. This is consistent with, but slightly different to, the first. Crucially he did not, as is often but erroneously believed, ask Mr Wood whether he knew of any cases in which mistake of law grounded recovery. He asked whether he knew of any cases of voluntary payment where it had done so, and where the party involved had known of all the facts. 117 The question therefore is whether the word voluntary is in fact surplusage; did Lord Ellenborough mean payments by mistake of law other than voluntary payments to be irrecoverable? It appears that he probably did not.
We do not need to show that the concept of voluntary payments had a narrow and certain definition in 1802. It did not. We merely need to show that Lord Ellenborough had a particular meaning in mind. His reference to Lord Kenyon's judgment in Chatfield v Paxton might be support for the position that he was concerned with submission to honest claims. 118 Certainly Evans seems to have thought so. 119 Lord Kenyon though said the action was maintainable as the claimant had not paid with fair knowledge of his case, which rather looks to the excusability of the mistake. As we have seen the case revolved around the extent of the claimant's knowledge, the excusability of the mistake, and whether his knowledge was enough to make it a voluntary payment. 120 It appears that it was the excusability of the mistake that Lord Ellenborough had in mind, although he probably misinterpreted Lord Kenyon's judgment as referring to fair knowledge of the law.
It is an interesting question why the idea of voluntary payment did not attach itself to mistake of fact cases in the same way. However, it seems clear that relief for mistake of fact was barred in those cases where payments were classed as voluntary, such as compulsion of legal process. 121 There had never been a dispute as to the recoverability of payments by mistake of fact, and payments by mistake of fact would be less greatly affected by the bar to recovery of voluntary payments and payments by inexcusable mistake. Arguments were, however, current in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries that payments under mistake of law ought not be recoverable, because the mistake was of law. If so, allusions to voluntary payments by mistake of law could be seen initially as a negative affirmation that mistake of law could ground relief in some cases. 117 
(D) A Preliminary Conclusion
It appears that in Bilbie v Lumley Lord Ellenborough barred relief to the insurer because his payment was voluntary. It is unlikely that he intended to bar relief for all mistakes of law, since he gave such relief in later decisions. However, the instability of the meaning of voluntary payment eventually led to almost every instance of relief for mistake of law being swallowed by a bar to recovery of voluntary payments. This was not helped by the confusion between voluntariness and excusability. If all mistakes of law were inexcusable, and payments under inexcusable mistake voluntary, the requirement, for irrecoverability, of voluntariness may well have dissolved as superfluous. This would be true irrespective of the fact that the requirement may have served to emphasise the initial prima facie right to recover.
(3) Other Pressures
That influential writers thought there were good reasons to bar relief where the mistake was one of law must have contributed to the move towards the bar. The confusion between barring recovery of voluntary payments, barring recovery of payments under inexcusable mistake, and barring recovery of money paid under mistake of law could not otherwise have produced the mistake of law bar. Birks was probably right to refuse to ascribe responsibility for the bar to Pothier, 122 but he did not ascribe it widely enough.
(A) Benthamite Thinkers
Austin argued that if ignorance of the law were admitted as a ground of recovery the courts would have to decide whether the party was really mistaken. 123 The maxim ignorantia juris non excusat was to be understood as meaning that mistake of law could not for administrative reasons be allowed to count, not because it could not morally be excused. 124 A legal system simply could not be run on the basis that the law applied only so far as it was known. This was a conclusion Austin only reached reluctantly, as it was a large exception to his theory of moral responsibility, that responsibility required knowledge of all relevant points. Lord Brougham LC accepted the argument of administrative necessity.
125 They were both in Bentham's intellectual circle.
126 It is likely they were aware of each others' views, although there is little explicitly on the question in Bentham's own writings. In Dixon v Monkland Canal Company 127 the pursuers attempted to recover fees paid to the canal company, mistakenly believed to be due, but which had been overcharged under the statute governing the canal. Lord Brougham LC suggested that the inquiry into whether the pursuers had been mistaken as to the law was impossible, and commented that 122 everyone would claim to have been mistaken, saying 'I am a very stupid sort of a man' and that he had misunderstood the law. 128 He argued
Are we in each particular instance to measure and gauge the knowledge of the law which an individual has? and having got at that knowledge are we to gauge his capacity to make the law apply to facts? because you must consider each person, under this doctrine as you would a lawyer, and you must consider how far he has that which was said to be the talent of a lawyer….Now these absurdities are so gross that it forces the admission that there must be some qualification, but I have not been able to ascertain what that is.
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This was in fact a Scots decision, but it is unlikely that the Lord Chancellor's, an English judge, view there did not affect English cases and judges. Nonetheless we cannot argue the bar was firmly in place in the 1830s. The voluntariness requirement had not yet dissolved.
(B) Story
Birks suggested that Benthamite thinkers lay behind the mistake of law bar, citing Austin in particular. 130 He did not claim that Austin could himself have triggered the hard line in favour of the bar, not least because the bar was in place well before first publication of Austin's lectures, but it is the Benthamites to whom we ought to look for its origin. However, Story was another fervent supporter of the bar in the 1830s and one whose arguments and influence have been overlooked in the hardening of the rule. He followed in the footsteps of others, who do not seem to have been as directly influential. 131 He used much the same arguments as Lord Brougham LC and Austin, but seems to have come to them independently. He did not cite Dixon v Monkland Canal Company and is unlikely to have been aware of the details of Austin's lectures, published as they were only after his own death in 1845.
Story argued that it was a well known maxim that ignorance of the law would not furnish an excuse for any person either for a breach, or an omission, of duty and that that was equally true of equity. The same principle applied to agreements entered into in good faith but under a mistake of law. They were in general valid. 132 The maxim ignorantia juris non excusat was regularly invoked, 133 and Story invoked it in the context of the equity jurisdiction. 134 Story claimed that the reason why equity acknowledged the maxim was to be found in the speech of Lord Ellenborough in Bilbie v Lumley where he said that otherwise there is no telling to what extent the excuse would be taken. 135 This is the same argument that Lord Brougham LC advanced. 136 Story did depart from the Austinian line in claiming that a mistake of law was prima facie inexcusable. 137 There may also be traces of that view in Dixon v Monkland Canal Company.
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He dealt with many of the cases that appear to support the grant of relief where the mistake is one of law. He distinguished some, as involving another known factor; 139 he declared that some might be wrong; 140 he argued in some cases that there was some factor of which we are unaware. 141 He argued that every case where relief seemed to have been granted for mistake of law was a case where there was some other factor in play. 142 He claimed that, where there is a plain and established doctrine on the subject understood by the community at large, a mistake of law could be evidence of other factors, such as undue imposition, which would justify relief. 143 In short the distinction between mistakes of fact and law was founded on sound principle and wisdom and only departed from rarely.
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His influence was considerable. The first English edition, by Grigsby, was published in 1884. 145 Indeed the very fact that Grigsby wished to use the name is testimony to the impact that Story had had both in the USA and England. Grigsby commented in his preface that Story had initially concentrated on English cases, but that over time, as more US cases were cited, a dedicated English edition had come to be needed. All the US cases had therefore been removed from the new edition. Nonetheless in places it is difficult to see the difference between the English and American editions. Grigsby used the maxim ignorantia juris non excusat in the same way, as in earlier American editions. 146 Indeed he practically left it word for word identical, although by 1884 the bar was well entrenched.
Story's influence can be seen in the citations that other equity treatises make of his work. Snell's Principles of Equity has become one of the leading equity treatises in England, and it rapidly gained that accolade. Snell commented that it was a well known maxim that ignorance of the law was no excuse for a breach of duty, and that that applied as much in equity as in the criminal context. An agreement entered into in good faith though in mistake of law was therefore to be held valid and obligatory. He cited Story for this proposition and no cases. 147 Broom argued that ignorance of law did not affect agreements, for which he too cited Story.
(4) The Dropping of the Requirement of Voluntariness
Kelly v Solari appears to have been the watershed case, after which it became accepted in the courts that the rule barring relief was a general rule applying to mistakes of law. Parke B formulated his famous test for recovery in terms of mistakes of fact, not mistakes generally. 149 It may have become generally recognised that the requirement of voluntariness had become superfluous. There were, however, still some diehards who refused to accept the dropping of the requirement of voluntariness, 150 even into the twentieth century. 151 Payment by mistake of law has even in recent times been equated with a voluntary payment. 152 There were cases earlier in the century in which the requirement of voluntariness was dropped. In Milnes v Duncan 153 in 1827 the defendant received a bill of exchange drawn in Ireland; the proper stamp duty had been paid and it was a perfectly valid bill. The defendant was in England and presented the bill a month late for payment. Payment was refused and the defendant applied to the claimant, who had indorsed the bill to him to pay off a debt he owed the defendant. The claimant refused to pay, because the bill was presented late, thus discharging him of liability. The defendant argued that the bill was void because the proper stamp duty had not been paid, and that he would have to explore other means of recovering the debt owing to him. The defendant mistakenly believed that it was an English bill on which a higher rate of stamp duty was payable. The claimant's agent agreed with this mistaken belief, and the claimant paid. On discovering that the bill was valid after all and need not have been paid, the claimant sought to recover the money. Bayley J held that if a party pays money under a mistake of law he could not recover it back.
In Wilson v Ray, 155 some 12 years later, however, the claimant agreed with his creditors that they would accept lesser sums in full settlement of their debts. The defendant refused to subscribe to this agreement unless paid in full. The claimant gave a bill of exchange for the difference between the full debt and the proportion accepted under the agreement. He subsequently paid the difference and attempted to recover this payment, on the ground that he had mistakenly believed such agreements to pay the difference valid. Lord Denman CJ decided that the payment was a voluntary payment in full knowledge of the facts and therefore could not be recovered. 156 This shows that the courts were still unwilling to abandon the voluntary payments formulation wholesale. Treatise writers were also unwilling to abandon it, even those who cited Milnes v Duncan. 157 This may be simply a case of legal conservatism, but the courts were noticeably happier to drop the formula after Kelly v Solari.
That mistakes of law could not ground recovery was practically unquestioned after Rogers v Ingham. 158 An executor, acting on the advice of counsel as to the construction of a will, proposed to divide in certain proportions a fund between two legatees. One of the legatees obtained the opinion of counsel, which was that this was allowable. The fund was divided. The legatee then filed suit, on discovering that the will had been wrongly construed. He sought repayment from the other legatee. James LJ said that no case had been cited where a party with knowledge of the facts had recovered for mistake of law. 159 In fact before its abolition there were hundreds of cases, which affirmed the existence of the bar.
(5) Conclusion
We have seen that the rule barring recovery for payments made in mistake of law was at least in part due to confusion between barring recovery of voluntary payments, barring recovery of payments made under an inexcusable mistake and barring recovery of payments made under mistake of law. This confusion comes about because of the multiple differing meanings that voluntary payments had and the capacity of some to swallow recovery for mistake of law. Lord Ellenborough's comments in Bilbie v Lumley are often said to be the foundation of the rule. In fact he only seems to have meant to bar recovery of what he called voluntary payments. Over the next half century any idea that not all payments by mistake of law could be classified as voluntary payments was lost under pressure from confusion as to what a voluntary payment might be, and from pressure from writers and increasingly judges -such as Lord Brougham -intellectually committed to the bar for a variety of reasons, not least the perceived inability of a justice system to operate without such a bar in place. From the middle of the nineteenth century the bar remained firmly in place, and so far as the law underwent further development, it did so by introducing exceptions to the rule until finally abolished in England in 1998, and subsequently removed in the contractual as well as the restitutionary context.
